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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The Utah Court . f Appeals has original jurisdiction over the filed Petition
for Review pursuant u> , .Lm ^ o ^ .Annotated §§35A-4-508(8)(a) and 78-2a3(2)(a).
STATEMFX

•
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Appeals Board abuse its discretion by refusing to consider the Recommends w on s
o; i.K lilting iieaiing Committee of the Employer, Salt Lake Community College,
issih: I MI Scpieii il>c 1 L\ 200M
H

I'LJiieyn v. Department of Workforce Services,
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an ongiiial proceeding
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dated November 14, 2008.

SI A M11'< III "i \JND ADMINISTRATIVE RULE PROVISIONS
im 11111 siai . .
by this Court with llu^ IVpiin 1

. . . . ,,viu4lJu. -uies are subject to interpretation

UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-1-304(2) reads as follows:
On appeal, the Workforce Appeals Board may on the basis of the evidence
previously submitted in the case, or upon the basis of any additional
evidence it requires:
(a) affirm the decision of the administrative law judge;
(b) modify the decision of the administrative law judge; or
(c) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of the administrative
law judge. [Emphasis added]
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-406(2)(a)-(c) reads as follows:
(a) Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous.
(b) Upon its own initiative or upon application of any party affected,
the division [Division of Adjudication! may on the basis of change in
conditions or because of a mistake as to facts, review a decision
allowing or disallowing in whole or in part a claim for benefits.
(c) The review shall be conducted in accordance with rules adopted by the
department and may result in a new decision that may award, terminate,
continue, increase, or decrease benefits, or may result in referral of the
claim to an appeal tribunal. [Emphasis Added]
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE R 994-508-401(2) AND (3), reads as
follows:
(2) After a determination or decision has become final, the
Department may, on its own initiative or upon the request of any interested
party, review a determination or decision and issue a new decision or
determination, if appropriate, if there has been a change of conditions or
a mistake as to facts. The reconsideration must be made at, or with the
approval of, the level where the last decision on the case was made or is
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currently pending.
(a) A change in conditions may include a Junge in the ia-A wnich
would make reconsideration necessary
rness to the parties w ho - ere
adversely affected by the law change. A change in conditions may a -o
include an unforeseeable change in the personal circumstances of the
claimant or emplover which woi lid have made it reasonable not w> ill a
timely appeal,
(b) A mistake
the basis for the decision. A mistake as to facts may include information
which is misunderstood or misinterpreted, but does not include an error in
the application of the act or the rules provided the decision is made under the
correct section of the act. A mistake as to facts can only be found if it was
inadvertent. If the party alleging the mistake intentionally provided the
wrong information or intentionally withheld information, the Department
will not exercise jurisdiction under this paragraph.
^ -.lie Depaniiiem .^ noi required to take jurisdiction in all cases
w here ifieic is a change in conditions or a mistake as to facts. r n Department will weigh the administrative burden of makim; :«
redetermination against the requirements of fairness and the oppiM uinsuo 01
the parties affected to file an appeal. The Department may decline to lake
;
a; isdiction if the redetermination would have little or no e - *>rt \ h mphusis
Added]
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June 8, 2G08, Mr. Nigohosian \\\v\ IIIM han»nl tiom |Ml rnif .Inytncnl wilh (L
Respondent Salt Lake Community College (hereinafter "S.l i' <' '' i Mr
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immediately filed for unemployment compensation with Respondent Department
of Workforce Services. (R.l-4). On August 19, 2008, following an informal
telephonic hearing, Administrative Law Judge Gary S. Gibbs (hereinafter "A.L.J.")
of the Department of Workforce Services rendered his Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law denying Mr. Nigohosian unemployment compensation. (R.
182-183).
Mr. Nighosian appealed the denial to the Respondent Workforce Appeals
Board (hereinafter "Appeals Board"). (R. 186). On September 18,2008, the
Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ's denial of unemployment compensation. (R.
195-200).
On September 26, 2008, Mr. Nigohosian filed a Motion to Reconsider and to
Reopen the Hearing with the Appeals Board. (R.205-211). The S.L.C.C. did not
respond to this Motion. On October 16, 2008, without explanation, the Appeals
Board denied Mr. Nigohosian's Motion (R. 213-215). This Petition for Review
followed. (R. 216-217).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Nigohosian went to work as an economics instructor at the S.L.C.C. on
September 11, 1994. When his employment was terminated by the S.L.C.C. on
June 4, 2008, Mr. Nigohosian was a tenured associate professor. (R. 5-21). As a
part of his employment, Mr. Nigohosian participated in the "concurrent enrollment
program", which allowed high school students to earn college credit. Mr.
Nigohosian would counsel high school teachers, provide resource material, and
visit the high school classes. To get paid for these services, Mr. Nigohosian had to
fill out and file "Liaison Visit Report Form". (R. 32-39, 99). S.L.C.C. initially
believed these forms were filed fraudulently in an effort by Mr. Nigohosian to be
paid for services not rendered. Mr. Nigohosian believed he had filled out a
confusing and ambiguous form correctly for the services he had rendered. After a
precursory investigation, Mr. Nigohosian was fired by S.L.C.C. on June 4, 2008.
(R. 183, 189-193).
Immediately following his firing, Mr. Nigohosian pursued the internal
grievance process established by the S.L.C.C. to get his job back. In compliance
with federal and state requirements, the grievance process culminates with a "due
process hearing".
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The all-day, due process hearing was held on September 14, 2009 before a
panel of seven (7) S.L.C.C. professors. Most of the witnesses at the S.L.C.C.
hearing were witnesses who testified before the A.LJ. at the telephonic hearing
with the Department of Workforce Services. On September 17, 2008, the S.L.C.C.
faculty panel made its recommendations. The recommendations include the find
that Mr. Nigohosian's dismissal from S.L.C.C. seems "unconscionably over
reactive". (R. 205-211).
The day after the S.L.C.C. faculty panel issued its recommendation. On
September 18, 2008, Mr. Nigohosian filed, with the Appeals Board, a copy of the
recommendation. (R. 201-209). However, that same day the Appeals Board issued
its decision without considering the recommendation from the S.L.C.C. faculty
panel. (R. 195-200). Therefore, on September 26, 2008, Mr. Nigohosian filed a
Motion to reopen the hearing for purposes of supplementing the record with the
S.L.C.C. faculty panel recommendations so the Appeals Board could be taken into
account by the Appeals Board in any reconsideration of its initial decision of
September 18, 2008 (R.205-211).
The S.L.C.C. did not file any response to Mr. Nigohosian's Motion. On
October 16, 2008, with one sentence stating "The Claimant's [Nigohosian's]
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request for reconsideration is denied", the Appeals Board rejected the Motion. (R.
2-3-215). As a result, Mr. Nigohosian filed this Petition for Review. (R. 216-217).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By statute and administrative rule, records in unemployment benefit cases
should be liberally re-opened to include new relevant evidence. The
recommendation from the S.L.C.C. faculty panel is such evidence. The Appeals
Board abused its discretion by not including the recommendation in the record in
this matter. This Court should remand this case to the Appeals Board with
instructions to include the recommendation in the record so that the Appeals Board
could properly reconsider this matter.

ARGUMENT
THE APPEALS BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO
REOPEN THE RECORD TO INCLUDE THE FACULTY PANEL
RECOMMENDATIONS.
Mr. Nigohosian's efforts to collect unemployment benefits are not unlike
thousands of others. Mr. Nigohosian believed his employment was terminated
without sufficient cause. The administration of S.L.C.C. believed they had
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sufficient cause for the firing. However, unlike most employment situations in
Utah, the employer, S.L.C.C, has a sophisticated process for an aggrieved
employee to challenge his firing.
In the context of awarding unemployment benefits, the law as to whether or
not an employee was fired for cause is very well established. The A.L.J, and the
Appeals Board, in their two main decisions, state the law accurately. The law is
also codified in Utah Administrative Code R 994-405-202. The critical portion of
this rule is quoted as follows:
(2) Knowledge.
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to
harm the employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should
have been able to anticipate the negative effect of the conduct.
Generally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer
gave
a clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a written policy,
except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of conduct. A
specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of
the
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been
given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the
employer had a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time
of the separation, it generally must have been followed for knowledge
to be established, except in the case of very severe infractions,
including criminal actions.
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The dispute between Mr. Nigohosian and the administration of S.L.C.C.
center around Mr. Nigohosian's "knowledge" when he filled out and filed the two
report forms. The administration argues that Mr. Nigohosian knew exactly what
he was doing when he "inappropriately" filled out the forms. Mr. Nigohosian
argues that he thought he was filling out the forms accurately for the services he
was rendering in light of the ambiguity and confusion of the forms. This dispute
is, of course, fact sensitive.
A critical and relevant fact in all such disputes is whether the employer
believes the firing to be with or without sufficient cause. In the case at hand, a
recommendation, from a panel created by the employer, finds that the firing of Mr.
Nigohosian to be inappropriate. This recommendation came after a full day
hearing, involving many witnesses and documents, involving three attorneys, and a
panel of seven (7) employees of S.L.C.C. Unfortunately, the faculty panel came to
their decision at the same time that the Appeals Board rendered its decision.
The law in unemployment benefit matters anticipates that changing or
developed facts may need to be added to the record in order to render an
appropriate and just decision. Utah Code Ann. §35 A-1-304(2) reads as follows:
On appeal, the Workforce Appeals Board may on the basis of the
9

evidence previously submitted in the case, or upon the basis of any
additional evidence it requires:
(a) affirm the decision of the administrative law judge;
(b) modify the decision of the administrative law judge; or
(c) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of the administrative
law judge.
This statute specifically authorizes the Appeals Board to accept additional
evidence such as the faculty panel recommendation. Additionally, the Department
of Workforce Services is directed by statute to maintain continuing jurisdiction
over the award of unemployment benefits. Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-406(2)(b)
reads:
Upon its own initiative or upon application of any party affected, the
division may on the basis of change in conditions or because of a
mistake as to facts, review a decision allowing or disallowing in whole
or in part a claim for benefits.
This statute specifically states the reason for why new facts may need to be
added to a record.
The Department of Workforce Services promulgated rules to implement the
above statutory changes. Utah Administrative Code R 994-508-117(5) reads as
follows:
The ALJ may reopen a hearing on his or her own motion if it appears
necessary to take continuing jurisdiction or if the failure to reopen would

10

be an affront to fairness.
Utah Administrative Code R 994-508-118(1) through (3) reads:
(1) The request to reopen will be granted if the party was prevented from
appearing at the hearing due to circumstances beyond the party's control.
(2) The request may be granted upon such terms as are just for any of the
following reasons: mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the decision. The
determination of what sorts of neglect will be considered excusable is an
equitable one, taking into account all of the relevant circumstances
including:
(a) the danger that the party not requesting reopening will be harmed by
reopening.
(b) the length of the delay caused by the party's failure to participate
including the length of time to request a reopening;
(c) the reason for the request including whether it was within the reasonable
control of the party requesting reopening;
(d) whether the party requesting reopening acted in good faith;
(e) whethertheparty was represented at the time of the hearing. Attorneys
and professional representatives are expected to have greater knowledge of
Department procedures and rules and are therefore held to a higher standard;
and
(f) whether based on the evidence of record and the parties' arguments or
statements, taking additional evidence might affect the outcome of the case.
(3) Requests to reopen are remedial in nature and thus must be liberally
construed in favor of providing parties with an opportunity to be heard and
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present their case. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of granting
reopening.
Although the two above rules apply specifically to hearings before the
A.L.J., when the matter has been appealed to the Appeals Board, the Appeals
Board has similar authority to reopen matters to supplement the record. Utah
Administrative Code R994-508-401(2)(b) and (3) read as follows:
(2) After a determination or decision has become final, the Department
my, on its own initiative or upon the request of any interested party, review a
determination or decision and issue a new decision or determination, if
appropriate, if there has been a change of conditions or a mistake as to facts.
The reconsideration must be made at, or with the approval of, the level
where the last decision on the case was made or is currently pending.
(a) A change in conditions may include a change in the law which
would make reconsideration necessary in fairness to the parties who were
adversely affected by the law change. A change in conditions may also
include an unforeseeable change in the personal circumstances of the
claimant or employer which would have made it reasonable not to file a
timely appeal.
(b) A mistake as to facts is limited to material information which was the
basis for the decision. A mistake as to facts may include information which
is misunderstood or misinterpreted, but does not include an error in the
application of the act or the rules provided the decision is made under the
correct section of the act. A mistake as to facts can only be found if it was
inadvertent. If the party alleging the mistake intentionally provided the
wrong information or intentionally withheld information, the Department
will not exercise jurisdiction under this paragraph.
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(3) The Department is not required to take jurisdiction in all cases where
there is a change in conditions or a mistake as to facts. The Department will
weigh the administrative burden of making a redetermination against the
requirements of fairness and the opportunities of the parties affected to file
an appeal. The Department may decline to take jurisdiction if the
redetermination would have little or no effect.
The S.L.C.C. faculty panel recommendations were not available when the
A.L.J, conducted his hearing. The recommendation was available while the
Appeals Board still had jurisdiction and prior the Board's decision becoming final.
Unfortunately, we do not know why the Appeals Board refused to reopen the
record to consider the recommendation. The S.L.C.C, when given an opportunity
to oppose Mr. Nigohosian's Motion, provided no response to the Motion. The
Appeals Board provided no explanation as to its reasoning.
The refusal of the Appeals Board to add the recommendation to the record is
reviewable by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. In such cases, it
means that the Court will grant to the Appeals Board "moderate deference and will
uphold [the Board's] decision so long as it is within the realm of reasonableness
and rationability." Arrow Legal Solutions Group P.C. vs. Department of
Workforce Services, et. al„ 180 P. 3d 830, 832 (Utah Crt. App, 2007). However,
the Appeals Board made no findings of fact or conclusion of law as to why the
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Board did not add the faculty panel recommendations to the record. It is the
Board's obligation to do so. Adams v. Board of Review of Indus Comm 821 P. 2d
1 (Utah, 1991). Absent such articulation from the Appeals Board, this Court
should remand this matter to the Board with instructions to add the
recommendation to the record and reconsider the Board's decision.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, this Court should recommend this matter be
remanded to the Appeals Board with instructions to the Appeal Board to reopen the
record to include the S.L.C.C. faculty panel recommendation so an appropriate
reconsideration can be held of the initial Appeals Board's decision.
DATED this ^ 3 d a y of February, 2009.

Joseph E.'TIatch
Attorney for Robert H. Nigohosian
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of February, 2009,1 served two

copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner on the following by depositing a copy
in the U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Suzan Pixton
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244
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Decision of Administrative Law Judge

Appellant

Respondent

ROBERT H NIGOHOSIAN
PO BOX 622
PARK CITY UT 84060-0622

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
%EMPLOYER ADVOCATES LLC
PO BOX 25236
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84125-0236

S.S.A,NO:

CASE NO:

XXX-XX-5265

08-A-04622

APPEAL DECISION: Benefits are denied.

CASE HISTORY:
Appearances:
Issues to be Decided:

Claimant/Employer
35A-4-405(2)(a)

Discharge

The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant was
discharged for just cause. No charge decision was made due to the Employer being a reimbursable
Employer.
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from August 19,
2008, further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City,
UT 84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utali.gov/appeaJs) setting forth the
grounds upon which the appeal is made.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective June 8, 200 8, the Claimant last worked
for Salt Lake Community College from September 21, 1994, to June 4, 2008. The Claimant worked as an
associateprofessor earning approximately $47,500 per year, The Claimantwas separatedfromthe Employer
for the reasons described below,
The Claimant participated in-a program sponsored by the Employer where the Claimant would work with
high schools in a concurrent enrollment program. The Claimant was entitled to receive $ 125 per month by
visiting the classroom at a high school and performing an evaluation of the instructor. In order to be paid
-il*-
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for the visit, the Claimant was required to complete a form entitled Liaison Visit Report Form. The
Claimant was also entitled to receive additional pay for working in this program on special projects for the
high school teachers. The Claimant was also required to list the work that he performed in special projects
on the Liaison Visit Report Form,
On February 26 and February 27,2008, the Claimant turned in two Liaison Visit Report Forms covering the
Claimant's work in two high schools. On each of the forms, the Claimant described additional projects the
Claimant had worked with high schools relating to a website. The form also asked the Claimant to report
whether the instructor was using the approved text book; was using the approved syllabus; and whether the
instructor was meeting the Salt Lake Community College curriculum requirements. The Claimant marked
these boxes "yes" on each of the forms. The Claimant also marked a box (<yes5> indicating that students are
assessed using the same methods and criteria as their on-campus counterparts. The Claimant also responded
to portions of the form requesting information about the subject matter and delivery style. The Claimant
responded "yes" on both forms to the question of whether the course was consistent with the on-campus
course. On one of tire forms, in response to comments and observation, the Claimant indicated the instructor
is well organized, and the students demonstrate respect.
For each of these dates the Claimant turned in forms, he did not make a classroom visit as required by the
Employer. The Claimant knew that he was not allowed to be paid for classroom visits if he had not actually
visited the classroom. The Claimant had the instructor sign the forms prior to the scheduled day of the visit
and did not make the visit. The Claimant did not indicate on the form that he had not visited the classrooms.
After turning in the forms, the Employer began to investigate the forms to determine whether or not the
Claimant had worked on special projects and whether or not he had visited the classrooms. On March 14,
2008, the Employer met with the Claimant During this meeting the Claimant admitted that he had not
visited the classrooms. The Claimant indicated that he did not intend to be paid for the special projects, but
listed this on the forms for informational purposes only. The Claimant told the Employer that he intended
to visit the classrooms, and felt that he should be compensated for his attempts to visit the classrooms.
The Employer continued to investigate the CI aimanf s conduct. The Employer contacted a law enforcement
official to conduct an investigation, and placed the Claimant on paid administrative leave. The Employer
made the decision on June 4, 2008, to discharge the Claimant for attempting to be paid for visits to
classrooms that he had not actually visited. Because the Employer discovered that the Claimant had not
visited the classrooms, the Claimant was not paid for the visits.
The Claimant's conduct of turning in forms to be paid for visits that he did not make harmed the trust
relationship between the Employer and the Claimant. The Claimant5 s conduct put at risk the Claimant being
paid for work he did not perform. The Claimant's conduct also posed a risk of harming the Employer's
relationship with the high schools.
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Unemployment Insurance benefits must be denied if the Employer had just cause for discharging the
Employee. In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35A-4405(2)(a) of the Utah
Employment Security Act, there must be fault on the part of the Employee involved. The basic factors as
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established by the Rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a), which are essential for a determination of
ineligibility under the definition of just cause, are:
(a)
Culpability. The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing
the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interests . . .
(b)
Knowledge. The worker must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the
employer expected . . .
(c)
Control The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's
control...
The Employer has a rightful interest in requiring employees to be honest and trustworthy in their dealings
with their Employer. The Claimant's conduct of completing the forms and attempting to be paid for work
that he did not perform was directly contrary to the Employer's rightful interests. The Administrative Law
Judge was not persuaded that the Claimant did not know how to fill out the form. The Administrative Law
Judge finds that the Claimant clearly intended to convey to the Employer by completing the forms that he
had visited the classrooms and wished to be compensated for those visits. By answering the questions that
related to classroom visits, the Claimant clearly conveyed that he had made the visits. The Administrative
Law Judge found the Employer's testimony to be credible that the Claimant reported to the Employer that
he did not intend to be paid for the special projects. This credibly rebuts the Claimant's argument that he
completed the form to be paid for the special projects, and not for the purpose of being paid for the visits.
The Claimant's conduct harmed the trust relationship between the Employer and the Claimant. The
Claimant's conduct was an act of dishonesty that was so serious that continuingthe employmentrelationship
would have jeopardized the Employer's rightful interests. The element of culpability is established.
The Claimant was aware of the conduct expected of him by the Employer. The Claimant knew that he was
not allowed to be paid for classroom visits when he did not actually visit the classroom. The Claimant knew
that he was completing the forms in a way that would convey to the Employer that he had made the visits
to the classrooms. The element of knowledge is established.
The Claimant was in full control of the conduct and circumstances that resulted in his discharge. The
Claimant could have refrained from turning in the forms prior to making the visits to the classrooms. The
Claimant could have also indicated on the form that he did not visit the classroom prior to turning in the
forms. The element of control is established
The Employer has established by a preponderance of the evidence the elements of culpability, knowledge,
and control. Just cause is established. Benefits are denied.
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DECISION AND ORDER:
The Department representative's decision denying unemployment benefits pursuant to Section 35A-4405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed. Benefits are denied effective June 8,2008, and
continuing until the Claimant has earned at least six times his weekly benefit amount in bonafidecovered
employment and is otherwise eligible.

/ w r y S. Gibbs
Aditfuiistrative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
Issued: August 19,2008
GG/tc
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WORKFORCE APPEALS B O A R D
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

ROBERT H NIGOHOSIAN, CLAIMANT
S.S A. No. XXX-XX-5265

CaseNo,08-B-00427
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
EMPLOYER

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS B O A R D :
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed.
Benefits are denied.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a decision dated August 19,2008, Case No. 08-A-04622, the Administrative Law Judge affirmed
the Department decision and denied unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant effective

June 8,2008.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining theteto.
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: August 25,2008.
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
1.

Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of
§35A-4-405(2)(a)?

FACTUAL FINDINGS;
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Claimant worked for this Employer as an economics professor for nearly 14 years. He was
discharged for falsifying pay documents. The Department and the Administrative Law Judge denied
benefits and the Claimant filed this appeal
The Claimant received a salary and was entitled to an extra sum for visiting high school classrooms
and evaluating the instructor and class materials. He was compensated per visit. He could also
request payment for time spent on special projects. He was compensated by the hour for special
projects. To receive compensation for special projects and/or class visits, the Claimant filled out a
form entitled "Liaison Visit Report Form." The form wa$ afilMn-the-blanktype form.
The Claimant submitted two questionable forms for payment. One form, Exhibit 23fl dated
February 26, 2Q08> listed the high school as Copper Hills. The form has a blank space after the
woids: "Hours spent on projects related to this class in addition to class visits." In the blank the
Claimant wrote the numeral "2." On several other places on that form, the Claimant wrote
statements and checked boxes which indicated he visited and observed a class. The form was signed
by the Claimant and the instructor, Exhibit 99 is similar except it is for East High School and
contains the date of February 27,2008, The Claimant did not visit either of those schools on those
dates.
The Claimant argues on appeal, as he did during the hearing, that the form was confusing, he was
not properly trained in how to complete the form, and he did not intend the forms in question to be
interpreted as a request for payment for a classroom visit. The Claimant's arguments are
unpersuasive. The form is very clear on its face. The form states "hours spent on projects related
to this class in addition to class visits" [emphasis provided] The Claimant's argument that he was
confused and in need of training on how to fill oat this form is disingenuous. In addition to the
printed material, the Claimant filled in the blanks with phrases like "Instructoi is well-oriented student demonstrate respect" that the "delivery style" was "lecture and discussion."
The Claimant states that he had the instructors sign the forms in advance in the event he had to leave
the classroom early. Singe he did not even visit the classes on the days in question, he should not
have used a pre-signed form obtained by misrepresenting how the form was to be used.
The Claimant's credibility is severely challenged by his own actions in this case, If he only wanted
compensation for the two hours spent on special projects, he would not have filled in the other
blanks on the form. He could have, and should have> noted on the form that he was not seeking
compensation for a class visit Instead he prepared a form that, on its face, clearly indicated he
visited the class.
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Department rules provide:
R994-405-202. Just Cause.
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements
must be satisfied:
(1)

Culpability,

The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it
would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's
prior work record is an important factor in detennining whether the conduct was an
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able
to demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employees
rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it mayfootbe
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm.
(2)

Knowledge.

The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the
employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to
anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of
conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive
disciplinaiy procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe
infractions^ including criminal actions,
(3)

Control

(a)
The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the
claimant's control Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a

08-B-00427
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reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the
claimant had the ability to perfonn satisfactorily.
(b)
The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to
perfonn the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a
good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill
or ability and a discharge results just cause is not established.
The Claimant knew, or should have known, that the forms he presented were deceptive. He knew
he should not submit deceptive forms. The knowledge prong of the just cause test was proved.
The Claimant had control over his actions. While he argues he did not receive proper training on
how to fill out the forms, the forms are self-explanatory. He could have clearly written what he did
on the forms. The control prong was proved.
The Employer was clearly harmed by the Claimant's action$. Even though the Claimant did not
receive payment for the class visits in question, he misrepresented his actions m what clearly appears
as an attempt to obtain compensation he was not due. This destroyed the Employer's trust in the
Claimant and once rent, it is impossible to repair. The culpability prong of the just cause test was
proved.
Havmg proved all three elements of the just cause test, the Claimant is not eligible for
unemployment benefits. The reasoning and conclusions of law of the Administrative Law Judge are
adopted in full.
DECISION:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying unemployment insurance benefits to the
Claimant effective June 8,2008, under the provisions of §35A~4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment
Security Act, is affirmed.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days fiom the date this decision is issued. Your request
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244,
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to
each party by the person i^akmg the request If the Workforce Appeals Boatd doea not issue an
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order, If a
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will i$$ue another decision, This
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for
such an appeal.
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals, Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision i$ issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City> Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35 A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules
9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD

Date Issued: September 18,2008
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WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

ROBERT H. NIGOHOSIAN, CLAIMANT
S.S.A.No.XXX-XX-5265

:
CaseNo.08-R-00498
RECONSIDERATION

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
EMPLOYER

:

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a letter received September 29, 2008, Claimant Robert H. Nigohosian requested reconsideration
of the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board issued in this case on September 18, 2008. The
decision of the Workforce Appeals Board was based on a review of a decision of an Administrative
Law Judge after a formal hearing.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Board has jurisdiction to review the request for reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §63-46b-13(3) on the grounds that the Board's decision was final agency action within
the meaning and intent of that section of law.
DECISION:
The Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied. The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board
dated September 18, 2008, remains in effect.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules
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of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9
and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

WORKFO

Date Issued: October 16, 2008
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I herebvcertify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on
this 16th day of October, 2008, by mailing the same, postage
prepaid, United States mail to:
JOSEPH E HATCH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
5295 S COMMERCE DR STE 200
MURRAY UT 84107
ROBERT H NIGOHOSIAN
PO BOX 622
PARK CITY UT 84060-0622
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
C/O EMPLOYER ADVOCATES INC
PO BOX 25236
- SALT LAKE CITY UT 84125-0236
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September 17, 2008
RECOMMENDATION FROM SITTING HEARING COMMITTEE
Hearing for Robert Nigohosian
Friday, September 12, 2008

As a result of the hearing for Bob Nigohosian, the Sitting Hearing Committee
recommends that the College reconsider his dismissal.
The College dismissed Mr. Nigohosian as a result of two concurrent enrollment forms he
submitted in February. Administrators believed that, with the submission of those forms,
he intended to commit "theft by deception" (p. 2 of College Position Statement) in
suggesting that he had visited two concurrent classes that he had, in fact, not visited.
Upon review, this Hearing Committee does not find the issue to be so simple. What we
do find is that both concurrent enrollment contracts and visit-report forms are vague and
ambiguous, and might invite different interpretations of what actually constitutes a visit,
and how to report ancillary work on the same visit form. The hearing on Friday revealed
that, in fact, a training session was held on April 28, 2008 (after the conflict with Mr.
Nigohosian) in an attempt to address some of the confusion that many concurrent
enrollment instructors have.
The hearing also revealed that Mr. Nigohosian may have been overseeing as many as ten
concurrent instructors, in addition to teaching his scheduled classes; this Committee
believes that to be an impossible workload, one which supervisors should not have
allowed.
The College Tenure Document, Section 8.3.15.1, states that "the administration has the
burden of proof to show that.. .reasonable cause exists"; we do not believe that the
administration showed sufficient proof that Mr. Nigohosian intentionally tried to receive
pay for work he had not done. We did gather that Mr. Nigohosian has been overseeing
concurrent enrollment classes for at least a few years, and we saw no evidence that
anything has been problematic before. This decision, as far as we could tell in the
hearing, seems to have been made on a "he said.. .she said" basis, without sufficient
evidence to support findings (we did not hear from either of the concurrent enrollment
instructors who were mentioned in the two forms). And we find that to be greatly
inadequate cause for removing a tenured faculty member who has been employed at the
College for fourteen years.
In fact, based partly on the lack of proof, and partly on Mr. Nigohosian's tenure at the
College, we strongly believe that termination is far too severe for what may or may not
have been an indiscretion. The hearing statement from the College says that "it was
determined that termination was the only appropriate disciplinary action" (p.3 of College
Position Statement). This Committee strongly disagrees with that statement, and strongly
believes that the imposed sanctions were too severe.

That same Position Statement cited the College Document, Section 10.3.4: "to remove
from Institutional employment faculty members whose inability to continue beneficial
service to the Institution has been clearly demonstrated." The Hearing Committee saw no
evidence that such an inability had been demonstrated, based on only two forms, which
were admittedly confusing, and reflected a minute part of a faculty member's entire
college involvement.
At best, there may have been some misrepresentation on one portion of the two forms in
question, but the overall ambiguity makes that questionable. According to the Tenure
Document, section 10.1, "The following sanctions are permissible for a violation of
standards...
(a) verbal censure
(b) written reprimand
(c) suspension with pay (not exceeding one year)
(d) probation
(e) reduction in status
(f) reduction in compensation
(g) suspension without pay (not exceeding one year)
(h) dismissal
If, indeed, there was misrepresentation, whether innocent or intentional, that may have
certainly merited some sort of sanctionsfromthe college. It may have been logical to
remove Mr. Nigohosian from the Concurrent Enrollment Program. If he had already
received the $250, it may have been logical to have him return it, perhaps with interest,
until the situation was resolved; but, in fact, he had not yet received the money. Referring
to the possibilities above, it makes sense that a conversation, and perhaps a milder form
of sanction may have been appropriate. Section 10.4.3 of the Tenure Document calls for
"Fairness to the faculty member involved, including such issues as personal
circumstances, prior service to the institution, and any other relevant matters to the
situation and the faculty." Mr. Nigohosian has been at Salt Lake Community College for
fourteen years, and he is tenured faculty. To jump all the way through the list to
"dismissal" seems unconscionably over reactive.
This Sitting Hearing Committee believes that the termination of Bob Nigohosian is
extreme, and that the College should seriously reconsider that action.
Respectfully,
The College Sitting Hearing Committee
Sue Briggs

Kathy Eppler

Maryln Harmer

Dean Huber

Art Kanehara

Rachel Lawyer

Ron Valcarce

